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Abstract
This paper studies an economy with trading frictions, ex post het-
erogeneity and nominal bonds in a model a` la Lagos and Wright [16].
It is shown that a strictly positive interest rate is a sufficient condition
for the allocation with nominal bonds to be welfare improving. This
result comes from the protection against the inflation tax.
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1
1 Introduction
Berentsen, Camera and Waller [2] (hereafter, BCW) show that in new gener-
ation models of monetary economics with preference shocks the existence of
a banking sector can help to reduce the inefficiency generated from the fact
that some agents are cash constrained while others hold idle money. This
source of inefficiency has been investigated by Bewley [7], Green and Zhou
[11] and Levine [17]. Other attempts to address this inefficiency include mod-
els with illiquid assets (Kocherlakota [14]), collateralized credit (Shi [21]), or
inside money (Cavalcanti and Wallace [9], Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides
[10] and He, Huang and Wright [12]).
BCW demonstrate that financial intermediation improves allocation and
welfare. This is due to the fact that sellers can deposit idle cash (and earn
an interest) and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints.
An alternative approach to reduce the above mentioned inefficiency con-
sists of replacing banks with nominal risk-free bonds. Using the basic frame-
work of BCW and Lagos and Wright [16] (hereafter, LW) this paper does
this by assuming that agents can acquire nominal government-issued bonds
once they realize that they have idle money. A crucial assumption here is
that individuals cannot sell bonds, i.e. they cannot borrow, which will make
clear that the welfare improving role of bonds comes from the protection of
the inflation tax and not that it may relax agents’ cash constraints. As in
Kocherlakota [14], it is assumed that bonds are illiquid in the sense that they
are not accepted in exchange for goods.
The LW framework is useful because it allows one to introduce heteroge-
nous preferences for consumption and production while keeping the distri-
bution of money holdings analytically tractable. Shi [22] also gets money
holdings degenerate but by different means. He assumes that the funda-
mental decision-making unit is not an individual, but a household with a
continuum of agents. For a detailed discussion of the two approaches see
Lagos and Wright [15].
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The main result of the paper is that a strictly positive interest rate is
a sufficient condition for the allocation with nominal bonds to be welfare
improving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework
and the agents’ decision problem. Stationary equilibria are characterized in
Section 3. Section 4 states the results. Section 5 examines a modification of
the tax system. The conclusions end the paper.
2 The model
The basic set up is LW. Time is indexed by t = 1, 2, ...,∞ and in each period
t there are two perfectly competitive markets that open sequentially.1 There
is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents and one perishable good that
can be produced and consumed by all agents. At the opening of the first
market agents get a preference shock such that they can either consume or
produce. With probability n ∈ R (0, 1) an agent can produce but cannot
consume while with probability 1 − n the agent can consume but cannot
produce. We refer to consumers as buyers and producers as sellers. Some
recent attempts to endogenize the fraction of agents entering in the market
include Berentsen, Rocheteau and Shi [4], Li [18, 19] and Shi [22].
Agents get utility u (q) from q consumption in the first market, where
u′ (q) > 0, u′′ (q) < 0, u′ (0) = ∞, and u′ (∞) = 0. Furthermore, we assume
that the elasticity of utility e (q) = qu′ (q) /u (q) is bounded. Producers
incur utility cost c (q) from producing q units of output with c′ (q) > 0 and
c′′ (q) ≥ 0 . Let q∗ denote the solution to u′ (q∗) = c′ (q∗). Buyers in the
first market are anonymous. Consequently, trade credit is ruled out and
transactions are subject to a quid pro quo restriction so there is a role for
money (Kocherlakota [13] and Wallace [23]).
In the second market all agents consume and produce, getting utility U (x)
1Competitive pricing in LW is a feature of Rocheteau and Wright [20] and BCW.
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from x consumption, with U ′ (x) > 0 , U ′ (0) =∞, U ′ (∞) = 0 and U ′′ (x) ≤
0. Let x∗ be the solution to U ′ (x∗) = 1. The difference in preferences
over the good sold in market 2 allows us to impose technical conditions such
that the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of
each period. All agents can produce consumption goods from labor using
a linear technology. This implies that all agents will choose to carry the
same amount of money out of market 2, independent of their trading history.
Agents discount between market 2 and the next-period market 1, but not
between market 1 and market 2. This is not restrictive since as in Rocheteau
and Wright [20] all that matters is the total discounting between one period
and the next.
At the beginning of market 1, after the idiosyncratic shocks are realized,
sellers hold idle cash while buyers may want more money than what they are
carrying. Before trade of goods takes place in the first market, sellers can
invest (they will) their money in a risk-free asset b bearing the gross nominal
rate of return 1 + i with i ≥ 0.2
As in Zhu and Wallace [24], this asset is a one-period, risk-free bond that
matures (automatically turns into money) in the second market; suppose that
there are vending machines maintained by the government which offer such
bonds in exchange for money. It is assumed that these vending machines have
a record-keeping technology of their activity and they can observe the owner’s
name and address which is printed on the certificate. That claims can be
costlessly counterfeit, and counterfeits automatically perish after they change
hand. It is also assumed that the technology for detecting counterfeits is not
available in the good market so agents do not accept bonds in transactions.
In this sense bonds are illiquid and money is the only medium of exchange.3
2A similar framework in which agents can either lend or borrow is in Berentsen, Camera
and Waller [3] and Berentsen and Waller [5].
3An exhaustive discussion of illiquid bonds is in Kocherlakota [14]. Restrictions on
bond circulation have been introduced also in Andolfatto [1], Berentsen and Waller [6]
and Boel and Camera [8].
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Figure 1: Timing of events
It is assumed that b ∈ R+, so that individuals can invest but not borrow.
Interest payments are financed by lump-sum taxes levied by the government
in market 2. The change in the nature of taxes does not affect the main
results of the analysis and will be discussed later in the paper.
It is assumed a central bank exists that controls the money supply at
time t, Mt > 0. We also assume that Mt = γMt−1, where γ > 0 is constant
and new money is injected, or withdrawn if γ < 1, as lump-sum transfers
piMt−1 = (γ− 1)Mt−1 to all buyers; things are basically the same if transfers
also go to sellers, as long as they are lump-sum (i.e. they do not depend
on agents’ behavior). We restrict attention to policies where γ ≥ β, with
β ∈ R (0, 1) denoting the discount factor. Let pibMt−1 = piMt−1/ (1− n) be
the per buyer money transfer. The time subscript t is omitted and shorten
t+ 1 to +1, etc. in what follows.
The timing of the events is shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of
market 1 agents observe their preference shock and buyers receive the lump-
sum money transfers pib. Then, sellers have the opportunity to invest their
cash in nominal bonds before trade of goods begins. In the second market
agents produce, pay taxes, receive the principal plus interest on bonds, and
consume. The structure of this economy is shown in Figure 2.
In period t, let φ = 1/P be the real price of money and P the price of
goods in market 2. We study steady state equilibria, where aggregate real
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Figure 2: Money, nominal bonds and taxation
money balances are constant. We refer to this as stationary equilibrium
φM = φ−1M−1 (1)
which implies that φ−1/φ = M/M−1 = γ; the Fisher equation holds, hence
it is equivalent to set the nominal interest or inflation here.
In nominal terms, the government budget constraint is
PG+Bi = T (2)
where B is the government debt outstanding at the beginning of market 2, T
is a lump-sum nominal tax, and PG is spending for government consumption.
Equation (2) states that the government expenditure (PG+Bi) is financed
by tax revenues (T ). To simplify the analysis, we assume G = 0.
3 Stationary equilibria
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V (m1) denote the expected value from
trading in market 1 with m1 money balances conditional on the idiosyncratic
shock. Let W (m2, b) denote the expected value from entering the second
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market with m2 units of money and b units of nominal bonds. In what
follows, we look at a representative period t and work backwards from the
second to the first market.
In the second market agents produce h units of good using h hours of
labor, pay taxes, receive repayment of the investment plus interest, consume
x, and adjust their money balances. The real wage per hour is normalized
to one. Hence, the representative agent’s problem is
W (m2, b) = max
x,h,m1,+1
[U (x)− h+ βV+1 (m1,+1)] (3)
such that
x = h+ φ (m2 −m1,+1) + φ (1 + i) b− φT (4)
where m1,+1 is the money taken into period t+1. Eliminate h from (3) using
(4) and get
W (m2, b) = φ [m2 + (1 + i) b− T ]
+ max
x,m1,+1
[U (x)− x− φm1,+1 + βV+1 (m1,+1)] . (5)
The first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to x and m1,+1 are
U ′ (x) = 1, βV ′+1 (m1,+1) = φ (6)
where the term βV ′+1 (m1,+1) is the marginal benefit of taking money out
of market 2 and φ is its marginal cost. In competitive markets (i.e., under
price taking), uniqueness of m1,+1 is a direct consequence of u
′′ (q) < 0, so
all agents in the second market choose the same m1,+1.
4
There are two main results from (6). First, the quantity of goods x
consumed by every agent is equal to the efficient level x∗ where x∗ is such
that U ′ (x∗) = 1. Second, m1,+1 is independent of b and m2. As a result, the
distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of the following
4See LW under bargaining and Rocheteau and Wright [20] under price posting.
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period. This is due to the quasi-linearity assumption in (3), which eliminates
the wealth effects on money demand in market 2. Agents who bring too much
cash into the second market spend some buying goods, while those with too
little cash sell goods.
The envelope conditions are
Wm (m2, b) = φ, Wb (m2, b) = φ (1 + i) . (7)
Let qb and qs denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by
a seller trading in market 1, respectively. Let p be the nominal price of goods
in market 1. It is straightforward to show that agents who are buyers will
never acquire nominal bonds. We drop the argument b in W (m2, b) where
relevant for notational simplicity.
An agent who has m1 money at the opening of market 1 has expected
lifetime utility
V (m1) = (1− n) [u (qb) +W (m1 + pibM−1 − pqb, 0)]
+n [−c (qs) +W (m1 − b+ pqs, b)]
where pqb is the amount of money spent as a buyer, and pqs the money re-
ceived as a seller. From linearity ofW (m, b) , expression (5) can be rewritten
as
W (m2, b) ≡ W (0, 0) + φ [m2 + (1 + i) b]
which can be used to rewrite the indirect utility function as follows
V (m1) = W (m1, 0) + (1− n) [u (qb) + φ (pibM−1 − pqb)]
+n [−c (qs) + φ (pqs + ib)] .
(8)
Once the production and consumption shocks occur, agents become either a
buyer or a seller.
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If an agent is a seller in the first market, his problem is
max
qs,b
[−c (qs) +W (m1 − b+ pqs, b)] (9)
such that
b ≤ m1. (10)
The FOCs are
−c′ (qs) + pWm = 0,
−Wm +Wb − λb = 0
(11)
where λb is the Lagrangian multiplier on the bonds constraint. By virtue of
(7) , if i > 0 then λb > 0 hence (10) binds. So sellers invest all their money
in government bonds. Again, using (7) the FOC for qs reduces to
c′ (qs) = pφ. (12)
Sellers produce a quantity such that the ratio of marginal costs across markets
(c′ (qs) /1) is equal to the relative price of goods (pφ). Due to the linearity of
the envelope conditions, qs is independent of m1 and b. Consequently, each
seller in market 1 produces the same amount of goods no matter how much
money he holds or what financial decisions he makes.
If an agent is a buyer in the first market, his problem is:
max
qb
[u (qb) +W (m1 + pibM−1 − pqb)] (13)
such that
pqb ≤ m1 + pibM−1 (14)
where (14) means that buyers cannot spend more money than what they
bring into the first market, m1, plus the transfer pibM−1. Using (7) the
buyer’s FOC is
u′ (qb)− φp− λcp = 0 (15)
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then eliminate p using (12) and get
u′ (qb) =
[
1 + λc
φ
]
c′ (qs) (16)
where λc is the multiplier on the cash constraint.
If the constraint (14) is not binding (i.e. λc = 0), condition (16) reduces
to u′ (qb) = c′ (qs), so trade is efficient. Conversely, if λc > 0 then the
constraint binds and u′ (qb) > c′ (qs). Hence, no trade is efficient and the
buyer consumes qb = (m1 + pibM−1) /p.
Differentiating (8) with respect to m1 yields
V ′ (m1) = Wm (m1) + (1− n)
[
u′ (qb)
∂qb
∂m1
− φp ∂qb
∂m1
]
+n
[
−c′ (qs) ∂qs∂m1 + φ
(
p ∂qs
∂m1
+ i ∂b
∂m1
)] (17)
where V ′ (m1) is the marginal value of money. Because the quantity of goods
produced by sellers is independent of their money holdings, it holds that
∂qs/∂m1 = 0. Note that sellers can derive no benefits from holding cash in
the first market, so they always spend all their balances in nominal bonds if
i > 0, this means ∂b/∂m1 = 1. (If i > 0 then Wb > Wm, hence (10) binds.)
4 Welfare analysis
Using (7), (12) and rearranging, equation (17) can be rewritten as
V ′ (m1) = φ
[
(1− n) u′(qb)
c′(qs) + n (1 + i)
]
. (18)
The first term within brackets, (1− n) u′ (qb) /c′ (qs) , refers to buyers and is
the same as in the basic LW model. Now, the second term, n (1 + i), refers
to sellers and indicates that they can invest a unit of money and receive 1+ i.
Hence, the effect of nominal bonds on the marginal value of money is positive
since sellers can earn an interest on idle balances.
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Before pursuing monetary equilibria, we have to derive hours of work
in the second market. Since all buyers have the same amount of money
at the opening of market 1 and face the same problem qb coincides for all
of them. In a symmetric equilibrium the same applies to sellers. Hence,
clearing condition in market 1 implies
qs =
1−n
n
qb (19)
then, efficiency is achieved at
u′ (q∗) = c′
(
1−n
n
q∗
)
(20)
where q∗ is the quantity such that (20) is satisfied. The buyer’s hours of work
in the second market are
hb = x
∗ + φm1,+1 + φT (21)
where x∗ is the quantity of goods such that the first equation in (6) is satisfied.
A buyer enters the second market with no cash, hence he has to work x∗ +
φm1,+1 + φT hours in order to consume x
∗ quantity of goods, pay taxes T ,
and take m1,+1 units of money out of the second market. Similarly, hours of
work for a seller are
hs = x
∗ + φm1,+1 + φT − φ [pqs + (1 + i) b] . (22)
A seller enters the second market with pqs units of money and he receives
interest plus notional (1 + i) b, while he consumes x∗, pays taxes T , and takes
m1,+1 units of money into the next period. Directly from (21) and (22), it
holds that sellers work less than buyers in market 2, i.e. hs < hb.
Aggregate hours of work in the second market are
h = nhs + (1− n)hb (23)
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which, using (19) , (21) , (22) and rearranging, can be rewritten as
h = x∗ − φiB + φT (24)
by virtue of M = [1 + (1− n)pib]M−1, symmetric conditions m1,+1 = M ,
b = m1 =M−1, nb = nM−1 = B, and using the fact that buyers in market 1
spend all their money, i.e. pqb = (1 + pib)M−1.
Now, use the budget constraint (2) to eliminate B from (24), and impose
symmetric conditions h = H and x = X to get aggregate hours of work in
market 2
H = X∗
where X∗ is such that U ′ (X∗) = 1.
In steady state monetary equilibria, inflation equals the money growth
rate (i.e., γ = 1 + pi), and the real interest rate is iR = 1/β − 1. Substitute
these terms directly into the Fisher equation, 1 + i = (1 + iR) (1 + pi), and
get
i = γ−β
β
. (25)
Now, use the second expression in (6) lagged one period, and (19) to rewrite
(18) as follows
φ−1
β
= φ
{
(1− n) u′(qb)
c′( 1−nn qb)
+ n (1 + i)
}
then take the steady state, eliminate i using (25) and rearrange to get the
equilibrium condition
γ−β
β
= u
′(qb)
c′( 1−nn qb)
− 1. (26)
Definition 1 A symmetric steady state monetary equilibrium is an interest
rate i satisfying (25) and a quantity qb satisfying (26).
At this point of the analysis, the main result of the paper can be intro-
duced:
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Proposition 1 A strictly positive interest rate is a sufficient condition for
the allocation with nominal bonds to be welfare improving.
Proof. Assume a strictly positive interest rate, i.e. i > 0. Now, let q˜b denote
the quantity of goods consumed in an economy without nominal bonds (see
LW). This implies
γ−β
β
= (1− n)
[
u′(q˜b)
c′( 1−nn q˜b)
− 1
]
. (27)
Since n ∈ R (0, 1) , the expression within brackets must be lower, for given
γ > β, in an economy with nominal bonds than without. Comparison of
equations (27) and (26) implies q˜b < qb for any i > 0.
BCW get exactly the same result with financial intermediation. In their
framework buyers can (they will) borrow, while here they are not allowed
to do so. So it is clear that the welfare improving role of bonds comes from
the protection of the inflation tax and not that it may relax agents’ liquidity
constraints.
5 Tax system
In this section we explore a modification of the tax system. Instead of lump-
sum taxes, it is assumed that interest payments are financed by distortionary
labor income taxes. This affects many of the results, such as the inefficient
level of consumption in market 2, but is not crucial for the main story.
As before, we assume G = 0. Thus, the government budget constraint (2)
becomes
Bi = PthH (28)
where th ∈ R (0, 1) is the proportional income tax on aggregate hours of work
in market 2. By working backwards from the second to the first market, it
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is straightforward to show that the marginal value of money is
V ′ (m1) =
φ
1−th
[
(1− n) u′(qb)
c′(qs) + n (1 + i)
]
(29)
which differs from (18) as we have distortionary taxes here.
The agent’s hours of work in market 2 are
hb =
x+φm1,+1
1−th
if he is a buyer, and
hs =
x+φm1,+1−φ[pqs+(1+i)b]
1−th
if he is a seller. Consequently, using (23) and rearranging, one gets
h = x−φiB
1−th (30)
then eliminate B using the budget constraint (28), impose symmetric condi-
tions h = H and x = X, and obtain aggregate hours of work in the second
market
H = X (31)
where X in (31) is such that U ′ (X) = 1/(1− th), with X < X∗.
The modification of the tax system does not affect the equilibrium con-
ditions, which we rewrite here for convenience
i = γ−β
β
(32)
and
γ−β
β
= u
′(qb)
c′( 1−nn qb)
− 1. (33)
As in the case of lump-sum taxes, a strictly positive interest rate is a
sufficient condition for the allocation with nominal bonds to be welfare im-
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proving; to see this note that equations (33) and (26) are identical. It then
follows that the main result of the paper (Proposition 1) is robust to alter-
native specifications of the tax system.
6 Conclusions
This paper studied an economy with trading frictions, ex post heterogeneity
and nominal bonds in a model a` la Lagos and Wright [16]. It is shown
that a strictly positive interest rate is a sufficient condition for the allocation
with nominal bonds to be welfare improving. This result comes from the
protection of the inflation tax.
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